Population Results

Pupulation Results is the fourth section. Population Results include population indicators such as juvenile crime and education of children and youth in San José. Population Results over time are the cumulative effect of all the efforts of all of the residents of San José to ensure a healthy and productive future for our children.



- 1. To review intermediate results from status reports go to page 83.
- 2. To learn about some of theory of change behind the BEST Performance Logic Model, go to page 85.
- 3. To learn about how we are doing in the area of juvenile crime indicators, go to page 95.
- 4. To learn about how we are doing in meeting educational indicators, go to page 104.
- 5. To learn about how our schools are doing in addressing the problem of educating our high-risk youth, go to page 110.

Intermediate Results from Status Reports

Intermediate results are developed each year by BEST providers and included in their contract for funding. Intermediate results cannot be directly linked in a causal relationship to the BEST services. The strength of the nationally recognized logic model, or theory of change evaluation design, is that service providers need only demonstrate signs of positive change for the better with measurements. The logic is that positive change, due to services, will impact and influence the intermediate results. For example, if a youth was arrested and referred to a BEST program and not re-arrested, this is an intermediate result. Similarly, if a youth was not in school and now is in school, that is also an example of an intermediate result. It took the efforts of the whole community to impact these intermediate results.

BEST providers beta-tested a status assessment on their clients before and after they participated in BEST-funded services. The beta-test was somewhat effective. The evaluators recommend that all grantees use this system next year. Grantees should develop more specific, common definitions while also customizing some status variables for their unique services. For example, truancy reduction programs need to track improvement in the truancy rate for their clients along with improvement in school. The status system is part of the integrated monitoring and evaluation system quarterly reporting.

The highlights of this year's beta-test showed some promising intermediate results:

- 375 youth who were arrested before were not re-arrested during this year's service cycle.
- 235 youth who were not in school before, re-connected to a school during the current cycle, which translates into 45% of the youth not in school getting back into school.
- Four percent (4%) of the youth in school dropped out of school during the current service cycle.
- Overall 1,062 youth had improved one of their status areas, while 324 saw one of their status areas deteriorate.

Status Intermediate Results

The following table shows the intermediate results from BEST Grantees that agreed to beta-test the system. The status that showed the largest percentage of improvement was change in "Arrest Status" and "School Status." Data is provided in the next two tables for these two important status improvements by BEST grantees.

Table 51

Change in Status of BEST Customers Before and After Service									
	N Deteriorated Unchanged								
Change in Job Status	1,858	3.6%	86.9%	9.5%					
Change in Housing Status	2,318	4.2%	88.9%	6.9%					
Change in Arrest Status	1,511	2.8%	72.4%	24.8%					
Change in Training Status	1,910	0.8%	96.0%	3.2%					
Change in School Status	2,562	4.0%	84.7%	11.3%					

Note to Reader: N is number of customers that data was available for for each of the status intermediate results.

Change in School Status Intermediate Results

The following table indicates the status of customers before and after the BEST service cycle to measure change in School Intermediate Results.

Table 52

Change in School Status									
	N	Deteriorated	Unchanged	Improved					
Asian American Recovery Services	80	1.3%	98.8%	0.0%					
Alum Rock Counseling Center	163	3.1%	31.3%	65.6%					
Bill Wilson Center	25	0.0%	88.0%	12.0%					
California Community Partners for Youth, Inc. (CCPY)	94	0.0%	95.7%	4.3%					
Cross-Cultural Community Service Center	53	3.8%	22.6%	73.6%					
Catholic Charities-YES	114	14.9%	83.3%	1.8%					
Center for Training Careers	91	0.0%	24.2%	75.8%					
California Youth Outreach	346	9.8%	81.8%	8.4%					
EMQ Children & Family Service	89	0.0%	98.9%	1.1%					
Firehouse Community Development Corporation	54	3.7%	88.9%	7.4%					
Foundry Community Day School/SCCOE	68	45.6%	52.9%	1.5%					
Family Children Services	129	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%					
Friends Outside	22	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%					
Filipino Youth Coalition	182	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%					
George Mayne School	112	0.0%	93.8%	6.3%					
Mexican American Community Services Agency	137	6.6%	88.3%	5.1%					
Next Door Solutions to Domestic Violence	390	0.0%	99.0%	1.0%					
Pathway Society	152	0.7%	99.3%	0.0%					
ROHI Alternative Community Outreach	235	0.0%	95.7%	4.3%					
Volunteer Center of Silicon Valley	26	3.8%	88.5%	7.7%					
All Agencies	2,562	4.0%	84.7%	11.3%					

Change in Arrest Status Intermediate Results

The following table indicates the status of customers before and after the BEST service cycle to measure change in Arrest Status.

Table 53

Change in Arrest Status									
	N	Deteriorated	Unchanged	Improved					
Asian American Recovery Services	80	0.0%	62.5%	37.5%					
Alum Rock Counseling Center	161	5.6%	83.9%	10.6%					
Bill Wilson Center	25	0.0%	48.0%	52.0%					
California Community Partners for Youth, Inc. (CCPY)	95	0.0%	91.6%	8.4%					
Cross-Cultural Community Service Center	7	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%					
Catholic Charities-YES	82	7.3%	90.2%	2.4%					
California Youth Outreach	373	1.9%	64.6%	33.5%					
EMQ Children & Family Service	77	0.0%	68.8%	31.2%					
Firehouse Community Development Corporation	36	2.8%	22.2%	75.0%					
Foundry Community Day School/SCCOE	68	7.4%	38.2%	54.4%					
Friends Outside	9	0.0%	55.6%	44.4%					
George Mayne School	26	3.8%	96.2%	0.0%					
Mexican American Community Services Agency	129	10.9%	62.0%	27.1%					
Pathway Society	85	0.0%	82.4%	17.6%					
ROHI Alternative Community Outreach	232	0.0%	87.1%	12.9%					
Volunteer Center of Silicon Valley	26	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%					
All Agencies	1,511	2.8%	72.4%	24.8%					

Importance of Population Results to the Performance Logic Model

The San José BEST Evaluation System uses a logic model or theory of change approach to evaluation. This system uses overall population results as an indicator for measuring the community's general well-being. BEST and other MGPTF programs influence these population results along with the efforts of other community partners and agencies. Social and economic factors, of course, influence population results as well. These population results are not used to evaluate individual BEST programs, but rather, to help focus community resources on improving these conditions for our children and youth. The following terms used in the BEST Evaluation System to define population results rely on the work of Mark Friedman, a nationally recognized expert in performance measurement and accountability.

<u>Population Results</u> (or outcomes or goals) are conditions of well-being for children, adults, families or communities. Results are data that voters and taxpayers can understand. They are not about programs or agencies or government jargon. Results include "healthy children, children being ready for school, children succeeding in school, children staying out of trouble, strong families, and safe communities."

Indicators / Benchmarks are measures which help quantify the achievement of a result. They answer the question, "How would we recognize these results in measurable terms if we fell over them?" So, for example, the rate of low-birth weight babies helps quantify whether we are getting healthy births or not. Second grade reading scores help quantify whether children are succeeding in school today, and whether they were ready for school two years ago. Juvenile crime rates, graduation rates, dropout rates, college readiness rates, and growth in Academic Performance Index (API) scores are all good population indicators where data is kept over time to allow us to see trends to determine if we as a community are making progress over time and if indicators turn in the undesirable or desirable direction. For example, crime rates and youth dropping out of school are desirable if these indicators go down. High school graduation rates and API are desirable if these rates and indexs go up.

"Rotten" Outcomes

Lisbeth B. Schorr and her colleague, Mary Jo Bane of Harvard University, use the term "Rotten Outcomes" to describe the rocky life course youths choose when they become a statistic in an undesirable way. These two researchers recommended that society could improve the childhood experience through program interventions such as San José BEST-funded services, and thereby reduce the incidence of "Rotten Outcomes" such as school failure, juvenile crime and violence.

Lisbeth B. Schorr is the Director of the Harvard University Project on Effective Interventions. She also co-chairs the Roundtable on Comprehensive Community Initiatives for Children and Families of the Aspen Institute. She is recognized as a national authority because of her research on improving the future of children, families and communities. In addition, she is regarded as a leader in major national efforts on behalf of children and youth.

Population evaluation looks at demographic groups across the city as a whole to determine the condition of children and youth, and measure the changes in those conditions over the years that San José BEST programs have existed. For example, one of the desired population result indicators is to increase high school graduation rates. To evaluate progress and achievement for this desired result, it is necessary to annually measure graduation rates for each high school in San José. This provides an objective way to see if graduation rates are improving – and by how much – from year to year. An important point to note is that many different programs and services may be involved in achieving a desired result. Using the example of graduation rates, numerous groups including the school district, parents, youth, local non-profit agencies, faith-based agencies, and others are involved in promoting better academic performance. The issue here is whether the San José community as a whole is meeting our goal of every child succeeding in school to develop the necessary skills for a healthy productive future. Educating and keeping our children safe is everyone's responsibility.

Program evaluation, on the other hand, focuses on the effectiveness and efficiency of individual services or activities. We hold each of the BEST grantees accountable for meeting their performance goals in providing the planned efforts and effects of their program's grant and contract.

Theory of Change is a helpful tool for developing solutions to complex social problems such as reducing the effects of gangs in San José. At its most basic, a theory of change explains how a group of early and intermediate accomplishments sets the stage for producing long-range results. A more complete theory of change articulates the assumptions about the process through which change will occur, and specifies the ways in which all of the required early and intermediate outcomes related to achieving the desired long-term change will be brought about and documented as they occur.

Indicators

A vital part of the evaluation process is collecting and analyzing data on "indicators." An indicator is defined as a measure of performance relative to a population, such as a rate or ratio about all members of the population. Indicators are important because:

- They help clarify what results we are trying to achieve.
- They give us a way to measure progress are things getting better or not? How much improvement has occurred?
- They give us a way to measure success are our indicators going in a desirable direction or an undesirable direction? For example, we want high school graduation rates to go up and juvenile violent crime arrests to go down.

The **population level indicators** will be used to measure success with respect to how we are doing in meeting the overall goal of the MGPTF to reduce gangs and juvenile crime, and prepare our youth as healthy and productive members of our society. Two important points must be understood about these indicators. First, it takes time to impact a population indicator. Continuing the example of high school graduation rates, it is likely to take four, six, or even eight years to see a noticeable change in graduation rates, because programs serve youth who will not graduate for several years, and programs need to get established and serve many youth before enough change will have occurred to impact the school population of San José. Second, BEST-funded programs and the members of the MGPTF alone cannot achieve the desired results. It will take everyone in San José working together to assist in addressing all the factors to ensure a safe environment where children in San José can receive a high quality education.

Summary of Population Results Indicators

The San José MGPTF Strategic Work Plan and BEST's Performance Logic Model Evaluation set as outcome indicators a number of population results to be tracked over time to determine how we, as a community, are doing. These results are derived from the effort, effect, and performance of the whole community of San José in raising healthy children who will have the opportunity to succeed in their lives.

The population results displayed in the following table are indicators that are going in a desirable and undesirable direction:

Population results are used to determine if key indicators are going in a desirable or undesirable direction over time. Population results can assist us to focus our efforts to move indicators in a desirable direction.							
Trend line going in a desirable direction	Trend line going in a undesirable direction						
1999-2007 Academic Performance Index Scores	1996-2007 Graduation Rates Based on NCES Definition - Declining the last four years						
1998-2007 Percent of Graduates Completing Requirement to UC/CSU	1997-2007 4- Year School Dropout Rate*						
1999-2007 High School Graduation Rates Based on the CPI Definition	2001-2007 Number of Alternative School Slots						
*The Number of Youth Dropouts for the 2007 School Year Declined by 4%.	Note: Indicators are not used to point fingers but use to assist everyone in the community to work						
2003-2008 Number of Gang Related Incidents	together to produce healthy productive futures for						
1997-2007 Ratio of Juvenile Violent Crime Arrests for 5th to 12th Graders in Public School	our youth. Educating and keeping our youth safe is everyone's responsibility.						

Graphic 4

Theory of Change

The MGPTF Strategic Work Plan defines an approach for the City of San José to address the complex problem of reducing gangs, gang violence, juvenile crime, and building safe and healthy neighborhoods in every corner of our city that utilizes the theory of change.

The BEST Performance Logic Model is also based on a theory of change that accepts the latest research on child and youth development, community building, and the most effective and efficient methods of delivering services to meet community needs. The services funded utilize the theory-based best practices recommended by proven

research: The research theories and practices used in the MGPTF and BEST theory of change are:

- Child and Youth Development Assets
- Importance of Resiliency Assets
- Importance of Community Building and Partnership Activities
- Importance of Maximizing the Pro-Social Forces in Our Community
- Importance of Building Family and Community Capacity
- Community Policing Theory

The following pages explain some of these proven theories used in the BEST programs.

Theory of Change

Role of Resiliency

For several years now, the City of San José has embraced the youth developmental asset and resiliency theory. As a result, it has required youth developmental asset-based evaluation designs for a number of its youth programs, required community-based contractors to demonstrate their ability to implement asset-building program components, and supported the effort to garner community-wide buy-in about developmental asset theory and approaches.

One critical component to youth developmental asset theory is resiliency. Resiliency is a concept first popularized in the early 1970s. Robert Brooks of Harvard University explains: "The hallmark of a resilient child includes knowing how to solve problems or knowing that there is an adult to turn to for help. A resilient child has some sense of mastery of his own life, and if he gets frustrated by a mistake, he still feels he can learn from the mistake." The extensive research on resiliency of Bonnie Benard, Senior Program Associate of WestEd's School and Community Health Research Group, indicates that the three core variables of resiliency are:

- 1. High expectations of the youth in the home, school, and community:
- 2. Meaningful participation of the youth in the home, school, and community; and
- 3. Presence of caring and supportive adults in the home, school, and community.

Caring and Supportive Adults

Dr. Emmy Werner of the University of California, Davis has conducted decades of longitudinal research on resiliency and provides the foundation for the resiliency framework in prevention and intervention. She writes that:

"Other buffers that we do know seem to cut across different cultures, **Table 54**

creeds, and races: There's no doubt about it, a close bond with a competent, emotionally stable caregiver seems to be essential in the lives of children who overcome great adversities. As we know from studies of resilient children a lot of this nurturing can come from substitute parents, such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, older siblings."

Dr. Werner suggests that the presence of a caring and supportive adult is especially important in fostering resiliency. While policy makers, educators, and other community leaders do not necessarily have control over the circumstances that create adversity for youths, they ought to focus on how best to support youths in overcoming it.

In a recent evaluation of over 30 youth service programs serving San José residents with BEST funds, CCPA found that the presence of caring and supportive adults correlates to the developmental asset level of the participating youth. This finding is based on the results of over 5,000 Risk Avoidance, Protective, and Resiliency Assessment (RPRA) surveys completed by participating youth. The RPRA has been used by over 150 community-based organizations and public agencies as a method of measuring the asset level of their youth customers. The short form of the instrument has an alpha reliability of .86 and has norms of high, medium, and low asset levels. Low assets are an indication of high-risk youths; medium level indicates at-risk youths; and a high asset level is an indication of youth with fewer risks of difficulties at home, school, and in the community.

Youth were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with four circumstances related to the presence of and their relationship to certain adults, such as teachers and neighbors. The table below shows how youth responded across asset levels. Results clearly indicate higher asset levels amoung youth who have a strong relationship with an adult at school or work, have a caring teacher, know their neighbors, and have a strong relationship with adults in the community. The presence of a caring teacher yielded the highest percent of high asset levels.

Relationship Between the Presence of
Caring and Supportive Adults and Asset Leve

Caring and Supportive Addits and Asset Level								
Variable	Normed Asset Level							
Strong relationship with	High Assets	Medium Assets	Low Assets	Total				
adult at school or work	nigii Assets	Medium Assets	LOW ASSEIS	Total				
Strongly Agree/Agree	42.7%	21.4%	14.0%	78.1%				
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	3.3%	6.7%	12.0%	22.0%				
Total	46.0%	28.1%	26.0%	100.1%				

My teacher really cares about me	High Assets	Medium Assets	Low Assets	Total	
Strongly Agree/Agree	43.8%	22.2%	14.5%	80.5%	
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	2.4%	5.8%	11.2%	19.4%	
Total	46.2%	28.0%	25.7%	99.9%	

I know my neighbors	High Assets	Medium Assets	Low Assets	Total
Strongly Agree/Agree	40.7%	20.6%	17.3%	78.6%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	5.3%	7.5%	8.6%	21.4%
Total	46.0%	28.1%	25.9%	100.0%

Strong relationships with	High Assets	Medium Assets	Low Assets	Total
adult(s) in community	-			
Strongly Agree/Agree	41.1%	19.7%	13.0%	73.8%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	4.7%	8.5%	12.9%	26.1%
Total	45.8%	28.2%	25.9%	99.9%

How are we doing in socializing our youth?

Socializing Youth

The presence of a caring and supportive adult is one way to help socialize youth. Youth without the presence of caring and supportive adults in their lives may be attracted and "pulled" over to the anti-social mindset and lifestyle. After all, the anti-social lifestyle also offers youth a way to gain and keep respect, a sense of family and connectedness, a sense of accomplishment and upward mobility, a sense of safety, access to money, a way to be engaged, a rite of passage, and a sense of structure and direction.

ANTI-SOCIAL PULL









Characterized By:

- · Anti-social peers
- Beliefs, values, and attitudes favorable to crime
- · Substance abuse
- Condones violence as way to solve conflicts
- · Poor self-management skills
- · Poor attitudes toward work and/or school
- Poor parental supervision, monitoring, or contingencies
- Other family problems, including child abuse
- Anger/hostility

Characterized By:

Meaningful and high level of participation in home, school, and community

PRO-SOCIAL PULL

- High expectations at home, school, and community
- Caring and supportive adults at home, school, and community
- Beliefs, values, and attitudes unfavorable to crime
- High level of structure
- Skills and assets such as problem solving, decision-making skills, and hope for the future




Who is Pulling for the Pro-Social Side?

The pressure to surround youth with pro-social influences may be greater now than ever. Policymakers and other community leaders need to determine what resources are available to counter the anti-social influences of gangs, certain parolees, and other anti-social adults. Experts on gangs and law enforcement officials agree that anti-social influences, such as gangs, have a well-organized team with a thoughtful gameplan. The pro-social team needs to ensure that it, too, is organized and working together. Does the community know who should be pulling on the pro-social team and in what order? Does the community know if there are enough people pulling on the pro-social side?

ANTI-SOCIAL PULL PRO-SOCIAL PULL







- · Adults on probation
- · Gang members
- Anti-social peers
- Drug using peers
- Parents who use drugs
- Parents who break the law

- Parents
- Relatives
- Teachers
- Pro-social peers
- Neighbors
- CBO Youth Workers
- Parks and Recreation Workers
- Police & Probation Officers
- Church & Spiritual Workers
- Coaches
- Social Workers

The way in which youth are socialized transpires primarily through three sources: home, school, and community. Currently, external circumstances have greatly jeopardized society's opportunity to socialize youth by whittling away at resources available to these three core institutions. For many families of youth experiencing anti-social influences, the home environment is characterized by high unemployment rates, unmet mental health needs, and drug/alcohol problems. In some instances, however, hardworking parents are struggling to find time to spend with their children as they juggle jobs, financial obligations, and other daily pressures.

Schools are characterized by a limited capacity to work with high-risk youth, diminishing funds and services for youth not in the educational mainstream, and decreasing alternative education opportunities for career and vocational education. Lastly, in the neighborhoods, funds for community-based youth services have diminishd over time causing a disruption in building capacity to work with high-risk youth and families, ultimately fostering a reliance on systems (e.g. dependency, delinquency, health and hospital systems) to help needy community members.

Society needs to find ways to connect youth to caring adults who can pull from the pro-social side. These adults can assist youth to connect to the opportunities available to them to build a healthy and productive future.

Who's Pulling for the Anti-Social Side?

Some of our communities have seen high concentrations of parolees and probationers in certain neighborhoods, an increase in the numbers of out-of-school youths, and an increase in gang recruitment activities. Results from a recent survey conducted by the Cornerstone Project indicate that low percentages of youth feel valued by the community. In other words, a large percentage of our youth do not see themselves as wanted or needed in our community. Youth want a meaningful role to play in our society. In the same survey, low percentages of youth indicated that they have positive, adult role models.

In order to better understand the anecdotal reports of high numbers of parolees and probationers in certain neighborhoods, CCPA worked with the Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office to gather data on this issue. Since the State of California's data system containing information about parolees is limited, CCPA was only able to gather data on the number of parolees in a one-mile radius of a given address. As a result, CCPA looked at the one-mile radius around each high school in Santa Clara County. CCPA then compared the results to the numbers of full-time equivalent teachers at each of these schools. While these data have their limitations, they do, nonetheless, begin to tell a story about who we, as a community, may rely on to serve as the caring and supportive adults in the lives of these youths.

The table below shows the results of this research. The table contains six columns. The first column lists the name of each high school. The second column lists the number of youth enrolled in the school. The third column lists the number of adult parolees living in the one-mile radius surrounding the school. The fourth column lists the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) teachers at each school, as reported by the California Department of Education. The last two columns give the ratios of enrolled students to parolees and enrolled students to FTE teachers. So, for Andrew Hill High School, there were 18 students per parolee and 21 students per FTE teacher. Ten schools had more parolees in its one-mile radius than FTE teachers; these schools are highlighted. The parolee data suggests that even for youth who are enrolled in school, anti-social forces are near schools, influencing youth everyday. Note: data in the below chart is from 2004, the last time the DA's office did the study for the Santa Clara County Juvenile Justice Plan.

Table 55

Parolees versus Full-Time Equivalent Teachers									
HIGH SCHOOL	School Enrollment - Number of Students	School State Enrollment - Parolees in FTE Number of One-Mile Teachers		Student to Parolee Ratio ("For every parolee, there are students.")	Student to Teacher Ratio ("For every FTE teacher, there are students.")				
Andrew Hill	1,927	105	93	18	21				
Branham	1,442	33	54	44	27				
Del Mar	1,279	65	56	20	23				
Dtn. College Prep.	275	148	16	2	17				
Evergreen Valley	862	15	48	57	18				
Foothill	524	129	31	4	17				
Gunderson	1,173	32	63	37	19				
Gunn	1,704	3	92	568	19				
Independence	4,167	68	180	61	23				
James Lick	1,235	134	63	9	20				
Leigh	1,621	15	65	108	25				
Lincoln	1,656	89	86	19	19				
Mt. Pleasant	2,071	77	94	27	22				
Oak Grove	2,670	72	116	37	23				
Overfelt	1,732	143	85	12	20				
Piedmont Hills	1,967	26	87	76	23				
Pioneer	1,353	41	66	33	21				
Prospect	1,214	2	53	607	23				
San Jose	1,121	142	58	8	19				
Santa Teresa	2,121	32	101	66	21				
Silver Creek	2,450	2	115	1225	21				
Westmont	1,665	9	67	185	25				
Willow Glen	1,302	21	66	62	20				
Yerba Buena	1,698	96	85	18	20				

Why is the ratio of State adult parolees to youth an important indicator?


Gangs actively recruit new youth into their lifestyle. Most adult parolees are either gang members or have affiliated with a gang to survive in the prison system. Many adult parolees have difficulty finding full-time employment and thus have plenty of time to hang out in the neighborhood. Some of these parolees see themselves as full time recruiters for their life-style. Many of the parolees are given the mission by their gangs to recruit new members. A story from a youth intervention specialist from a BEST-funded service provider, California Youth Outreach, highlights this problem.

"I was working in the neighborhood with some high-risk youth when a gang involved adult parolee who was all tagged up with tattoos came up to me and asked what I was doing. I said, I was working with youth to encourage them to go to school and set goals for their future that avoided the dangers of gangs, violence, and drugs. He said, "How many hours a week do you work with these youth?" I answered three to four hours a week. He smiled and said, "I am out here 24/7, who do you think is going to win?"



Some parollees are like full time youth workers who recruit youth into a "criminal" or "street" code of behavior or mindset.





Why is family and community so important?

Policy-makers and other community leaders are engaged in the difficult task of setting budget and policy priorities. This exercise is inherently difficult, but more so when resources are limited, as is the current circumstance for the County of Santa Clara. Decision-makers may want to be mindful of the compelling evidence that highlights the importance of building family and community capacity to work with anti-social and other troubled youth.

Building Family and Community Capacity

A report entitled, *Preventing Problems*, *Promoting Development*, *Encouraging Engagement* (Pittman, 2001) emphasized the importance of supporting and strengthening the position of the "natural actors" in the lives of youth: family, peers, neighbors, and community institutions. Pittman explains that intervention programs and services are certainly needed.

"But the big picture task is to help families, neighbors, and communities nurture, support, and demand excellence from their youth. This requires sustained investments in community institutions, associations, and infrastructures."

Researchers at the Search Institute explain that some communities have enough resources for a young person to get all that he or she needs from family, neighbors, and a wide array of pro-social experiences. However, when communities do not have sufficient services and opportunities, both in terms of quantity and quality, additional supports may need to be created (Scales & Leffert, 1999). Decision-makers may have to create services, supports, and opportunities such as surrogate families, community organizations, alternative school settings, and employment.

The diagram that follows illustrates the four core resources upon which society relies to resolve issues that youth face.

- (1) The center of the concentric circles is the youth him/herself. The most preferable way for resolution is for the youth to have the ability to identify the issues by him/herself, access resources as needed, and address the problem.
- (2) The second most preferable way for resolution is for the family, the next most immediate extension to the youth, to support the youth and address the problem.
- (3) The third closest extension to the youth is community: neighbors, teachers, coaches, or community-based service providers, to name a few. Community is the third most preferable method of resolving issues and, if effective, can prevent the need for law enforcement, court, or social worker intervention.
- (4) The least preferable way to address youth problems is through "Systems." Systems (e.g. dependency, delinquency, or health and hospital systems) are defined as large institutions, generally government-run, such as the courts, Juvenile Hall, emergency room, or Children's Shelter. While these Systems provide a safety net and critical services related to health care, public safety, and child protection, these more costly services should be reserved for those youth and families who have exhausted the first three methods.

While severe budget cuts must be endured by both communities and Systems, decision-makers should keep in mind that the perpetual disruption or dissolution of resources to communities may foster society's reliance on Systems, the more costly and least ideal place to resolve problems. At the same time, community-based service providers need to practice continuous improvement and demonstrate their effectiveness. Communities and Systems should recognize the significant services that each provides, respect the fact that each has an important place on the continuum, and create an environment for the seamless flow of referrals from one to the other.

Strategy for Building Capacity

Graphic 5

Least Preferable: Youth issues too complex and severe; public safety may be compromised; must rely on more costly System intervention (e.g. courts, emergency room, detention, etc.).

Next Closest Extension to Family: Neighbors or community-based service providers can respond to youth and family needs; prevent need for police, courts, or social workers to intervene.

systems

Communities

Closest Extension to Youth: Family can identify issues, access resources, support youth, and resolve issues on its own.

Nost to Least Preferred

Most Preferable: Youth can identify and resolve issues on her own.



Juvenile Crime as an Indicator

A declining juvenile crime rate is an indicator of a community's progress in socializing youth and helping youth to develop a pro-social attitude for the future. If the juvenile crime rate is increasing, it may indicate that we are losing our youth to an anti-social, criminal, and/or gang mindset. While not all juvenile delinquents become adult criminals, virtually all adult chronic offenders were once juvenile offenders. Juvenile crime rates, especially for older youth, are also an indicator of community safety. The juvenile crime rate in San José has declined for several years and has begun to go back up in the last three years. The following charts show the direction of the juvenile crime rate over time and the recent up turn in an undesirable direction.

Limitations to Crime Data

Readers are cautioned that determining the extent to which the BEST Program has had an impact on reducing crime is beyond the scope of this evaluation. As noted pioneer criminologist Enrico Ferri stated, "Crime is not an isolated phenomenon that can be attacked directly because crime is a by-product of the social, cultural, and economic conditions in which we live." The theory behind the MGPTF and the BEST Program is that the approach taken will address all of the root causes mentioned by Mr. Ferri.

Why a Drop in Crime?

Franklin E. Zimring's recent book, "The Great American Crime Decline", documents the decline in crime as the longest and largest since World War II. It ranged across both violent and nonviolent crime. He concludes, as Enrico Ferri did 100 years ago, that there is no magic bullet, but rather a combination of factors working in concert which caused the decline. There are many theories about the current national drop in crime over the last decade. Some experts attribute the drop in crime to the healthy economy (more jobs). Others believe it is community policing. Still others say it is demographics (fewer 18 to 24 year-olds). Finally, some say it is tougher and longer prison sentences. There is a consensus building that it is a combination of these factors. The recent acceptance of the principles of community oriented policing — when police and other law enforcement groups join as partners with the community to solve problems — is a factor that is present in the BEST and other MGPTF-related programs. This component is led by the nationally recognized San José Police Department's efforts in community directed policing. Community mobilization to accept new norms of behavior and to lower the tolerance of bad behavior has also been given credit for reducing crime. This new norm thesis is a factor in the City of San José given the success of Project Crackdown, the Strong Neighborhoods Initiative, and the Neighborhood Development Center. Some accept the "broken window" thesis: if a broken window is not fixed, there will soon be many broken windows. The limits of this evaluation will not allow for a definitive explanation as to why juvenile crime in Santa Clara County has declined over time. Readers may conclude, however, that the decline is due to a combination of factors and cannot be attributed to any one program. There is also consensus that much more can be done to continue the reduction of crime dating back to 1994, especially since there are indications that the crime rate for juveniles and adults is starting to go up again.

"Crime is not an isolated phenomenon that can be attacked directly because crime is a by-product of the social, cultural, and economic conditions in which we live."

Noted Early 20th Century Criminologist Enrico Ferri

Lessons from Los Angeles

Perhaps the biggest lesson from the rapid rebound in Los Angeles gang murders, say police and other gang experts, is that aggressive policing alone will never break the cycle of gang violence. Father Greg Boyle, a Jesuit priest who works in gang-infested Boyle Heights, says the anti-gang strategy developed in California and copied elsewhere "is bankrupt. You have the three-strikes law and jail and so on, but you can't terrify a kid into being hopeful about his future." Many law enforcement officials and experts agree. "We do not need laws," says Sergeant Wes McBride, founder of the California Gang Investigation Association and a 28-year veteran of anti-gang policing. "We have a penal code a foot thick. You can't just work gangs with police suppression. You need prevention and intervention programs too. Gangs, it turns out, can take more beatings and lock-down time than any humane society is prepared to deal out."


Over Time, Juvenile Felony Arrests Are Going Down In a Desirable Direction

Since 1997, juvenile felony arrests have been decreasing, or moving in a desirable direction. In 2005, 2006, and 2007, juvenile felony arrests increased or changed trajectory in an undesirable direction. This up-swing, following eight years of decreasing juvenile felony arrests, is illustrated in the charts below:

Table 56

San José Juvenile	San José Juvenile Felony Arrests Crime Ratio to 100,000 (5th to 12th Grade) Youth in Public School										
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Juv. Felony Arrests	2,432	2,138	1,824	1,878	1,524	1,364	1,480	1,180	1,669	1,691	1,752
Male	2,020	1,806	1,538	1,564	1,254	1,122	1,230	944	1,381	1,393	1,545
Female	412	332	286	314	271	242	250	236	288	298	298
Homicide	3	2	2	2	0	4	0	0	0	3	0
Forcible Rape	28	16	20	13	17	12	7	4	7	5	8
Robbery	194	148	131	148	92	92	79	103	100	164	162
Assault	358	293	300	321	259	279	277	237	329	258	292
Kidnapping	10	11	11	28	8	1	0	0	1	0	0
Total Violent Crime	593	470	464	512	376	388	363	344	437	430	462
School Population 5TH - 12TH GRADE											
(THOUSANDS)	75.7	75.9	76.4	76.7	75.1	76.2	76.5	77.2	77.0	76.4	76.9
TOTAL: Ratio Per 100,000 Sch. Pop.											
Juv. Felony Arrests Ratio	321.3	281.7	238.7	244.9	202.9	179.0	193.5	152.8	216.8	221.3	227.8

Chart 26




State of California Attorney General's Office - Criminal Justice Statistics Center

Over Time, the Ratio of Juvenile Felony Arrests to 100,000 San José Youth in 5th to 12th Grade Are Going Down In a Desirable Direction

The ratio of juvenile felony arrests to 100,000 5th to 12th graders enrolled in San José schools shows the same trends as the number of juvenile arrests. Over time the ratio has gone in a desirable direction with an up-swing in an undesirable direction in 2005, 2006 and 2007.

Chart 27



Data from: State of California Attorney General's Office - Criminal Justice Statistics Center


Over Time, Juvenile Violent Crimes is Going Down in a Desirable Direction

Since 1997, juvenile violent crimes had been decreasing, or moving in a desirable direction in San José. In 2005, 2006, and 2007 juvenile violent crimes increased. The recent increase in juvenile violent crime is moving in an undesirable direction. The types of violent crime (homicide, forcible rape, robbery, assault, and kidnapping) and the number of arrests is found in Table 56. The eight years of declining juvenile violent crime arrests and the increasing number juvenile violent crime arrests over the last three years is demonstrated on the charts below:

Table 57

San José Juvenile Violent Crime Ratio to 100,000 (5th to 12th Grade) Youth in Public School											
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total Juv. Violent Crime	593	470	464	512	376	388	363	344	437	430	462
School Population 5TH -											
12TH GRADE											
(THOUSANDS)	75.7	75.9	76.4	76.7	75.1	76.2	76.5	77.2	77.0	76.4	76.9
TOTAL: Ratio Per											
100,000 Sch. Pop.											
Violent Crimes Ratio	78	62	61	67	50	51	47	45	57	56	60

Chart 28




Data from: State of California Attorney General's Office - Criminal Justice Statistics Center

Over Time, the Ratio of Juvenile Violent Crimes to 100,000 San José Youth in 5th to 12th Grades Are Moving in a Desirable Direction

The ratio of juvenile violent crimes to 100,000 5th to 12th graders enrolled in San José schools shows the same trend as the number of juvenile violent crimes. Over time, the ratio has moved in a desirable direction with an up-swing in an undesirable direction in 2005, 2006, and 2007.

Chart 29




Data from:

State of California Attorney General's Office - Criminal Justice Statistics Center

Number of Gang Related Incidents in San José Has Decreased by 27% from Last Year

Data from the San José Police Department Crime Analysis Unit for gang related incidents over the last five years shows a slightly increasing trendline moving in an undesirable direction. December 2007 to November of 2008 showed a 27% decrease when compared to the previous year that had the highest number of gang related incidents in the last five years.

Chart 30




Note: In March of 2008, Gang related graffiti was added to calculations of gang related incidents. For comparison over time, graffiti incidents were not included in the following charts.

Gang Related Incidents Peaked in September of 2007

Gang related incidents, as shown in the next charts, are from December of 2004 to November 30, 2008. Gang related incidents peaked in September of 2007 and have been below the peak in September 2007. As reported in the previous chart the number of incidents is down from last year for the same time period by 27%.


Chart 31



Gang Related Incidents by Month

The following chart shows the number of gang related incidents for the last three years. This year, gang related incidents were up in the months of April and May of 2008 but down compared the previous year (2006-07). Overall, gang related incidents were down for every month except July as compared to 2007.

Chart 32




The Number of Gang Related Incidents Are Down When Comparing This Year to Last Year for the First Eleven Months

The following chart shows the number of gang related incidents in three categories: Violent Gang Related Incidents, Simple Assault Gang Related Incidents, and Non-Violent Gang Related Incidents.

- Violent Gang Related Incidents were down 16% for the first 11 months of this year as compared to the first 11 months of last year.
- Simple Assault Gang Related Incidents were down 42% for the first 11 months of this year as compared to the first 11 months of last year.
- Non-Violent Gang Related Incidents were down 31% for the first 11 months of this year as compared to the first 11 months of last year.

Chart 33




89% of Gang Related Offenders Were Under the Age of 25 Years Old

The ages of offenders involved in gang related incidents between October 1, 2007 and September 28, 2008 indicate that 89% of the offenders were under the age of 25 years. The largest sub-group of offenders (64%) were between the ages of 15 and 19 years old.

Chart 34


Note: One case may have multiple offenders. Conversely, a case may not have a victim as both parties were arrested/cited, or the victim is a business.



72% of Gang Related Victims Were Under the Age of 25 Years Old

The ages of victims in gang related incidents between October 1, 2007 and September 28,2008 indicate that 72 % of the victims were under the age of 25 years. The largest sub-group of victims (40%) were between the ages of 15 and 19 years old.

Chart 35



School Success as "Headline Results"

Lisbeth B. Schorr writes, "In today's world, a youngster who leaves school unable to read, write, and do simple arithmetic faces a bleak future. When a substantial proportion of boys and girls leave school uneducated, the rest of us face a bleak future. Americans have always seen education as the best route to individual achievement — and as being necessary to the maintenance of democracy, the softening of class lines, and the operation of productive and profitable economy. Today, a good education is far more necessary than ever before." (Schorr 1988)

The following population results indicate that San José residents working together have advanced in a desirable direction as relates to school success:

- The number of San José high school students who have completed requirements for California Public University (UC/CSU) admissions
- San José school districts' Academic Performance Index (API) Scores have improved by 12% since 1999.
- High school graduation rates based on Cumulative Promotion Index (CPI) definition. The CPI high school graduation rate has turn in a desirable direction for the 2007 school year.


The following population results indicate that San José residents working together have advanced in an undesirable direction as relates to school success:

- High school graduation rates based on the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) definition have declined slightly over time, but especially in the last four years.
- San José high schools' four-year dropout rates have shifted trajectory in an undesirable direction when viewed over time, though during the 2007 school year, the dropout rate shifted in a desirable direction.

Graduation Rate based on CPI Definition

The Harvard Civil Rights Project recommends using the Cumulative Promotion Index (CPI) instead of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) formula which tends to overestimate the graduation rate. This table indicates the CPI Graduation Rate from 2000 through 2007. The CPI graduation rate has improved since the 1999-2000 school year in a favorable direction. The trendline is increasing over the last eight school years.


Chart 36 - Cumulative Promotion Index (CPI)



CPI FORMULA E=Enrollment G=Graduates
(E10 2002/E9 2001)*(E11 2002/E10 2001)*(E12 2002/E11 2001)*(G 2001/E12 2001)

The NCES graduation rate for 2007 is 78%. The CPI graduation rate for 2007 is 77%. The CPI Graduation Rate has improved by 7% since 2000.

The CPI graduation indicator shows a positive growth in the slope of change over time. The NCES graduation indicator formula shows a slightly declining slope over time in an unfavorable direction.




PART TWO POPULATION POPULATION POPULATION PART TWO

Graduation Rate based on NCES Definition

The State of California uses the NCES formula and definition to define graduation rates. The NCES graduation rate for San José public high schools has been declining over the past four years. After six years of progress the curve for NCES graduation rates began turning in an undesirable direction beginning in 2003.

Chart 37 - National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES)

The NCES graduation rate has declined by 7% since 1996 and 12% since 2003. The formula on the bottom of the page describes how the NCES graduation rate is calculated. It is important to note that the NCES graduation rate formula calculation includes dropouts. Due to the increase in dropouts over the last four years, the curve for NCES graduation rates has continued to turn in an undesirable direction.



*Graduation Rate Formula is based on the NCES definition:

Number of Graduates (Year 4)

divided by


Number of Graduates (Year 4) + Gr. 9 Dropouts (Year 1) + Gr. 10 Dropouts (Year 2) + Gr. 11 Dropouts (Year 3) + Gr. 12 Dropouts (Year 4)

Note: The California State Department of Education DataQuest (http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/) is the data source for the following tables and charts.

Forty-Six Percent of Youth are Prepared for the University of California and California State University Systems

Since 1998, the percentage of San José youth that are eligible for admission into the University of California and/or the California State University (UC/CSU) systems has increased by 48%. This trend has continued to rise and go in a desirable direction for the past five years.

Chart 38



The percentage of San José seniors that completed the requirements to attend the UC/CSU system is up 48% since 1998.



Table 58

Percent of High School Graduates with Requirements to Attend UC/CSU System

	2006								
	Grade 12	Number							
District	Enrollment	UC/CSU	%						
Campbell Union High	1,436	476	33%						
East Side Union High	4,911	1,692	35%						
San Jose Unified	1,792	1,182	66%						
Santa Clara Co. Office Of Education	70	-	0%						
Total	8,209	3,350	41%						

San José High Schools Had 1,935 Youth Drop Out of School in 2007 Down 594 From Last year

The chart below reflects the dropout rate for Campbell Union, East Side Union and San José Unified School Districts. In 2007, East Side Union High School District had the largest number of youth that dropped out of school (1,311). Overall, the number of youth dropping out of school in San José has decreased by 594 youth from the previous year, reflecting a 24% reduction. It is important to note that the dropout rate in San José is going in a desirable direction at a time when most school districts dropout rate increased when the new California data system began using student level data to track youth.

Chart 39




Table 59


Total Drop Outs San José Grades 9-12 2007							
	2006 Drop	2007 Drop					
District	Outs	Outs					
Campbell Union High	478	350					
East Side Union High	1,793	1,311					
San Jose Unified	258	274					
Total Drop Outs	2,529	1,935					

The number of four year drop -outs has clearly turned in a desirable direction this year. The four year drop out rate went down by 24% in San José high schools. This was the first year that student level data was used to track students who moved to other California public schools to make sure they re-registered. San José high schools beat the statewide trend of increased number of drop outs with the use of student level data.

Four Year High School Drop Out Rate Turned in a Desirable Direction This Year - First Decline Since 2002

The following chart shows that the dropout rate for San José high schools has turned in a desirable direction. From 2002 to 2006, the dropout rate in San José continued to climb in an undesirable direction; however, the dropout rate from 2006 to 2007 has shown a four percent decline.

Chart 40



Four- Year Derived Rate Formula: (1-((1-(drop gr 9/enroll gr 9))*(1-(drop gr 10/enroll gr 10))*(1-(drop gr 11/enroll gr 11))*(1-(drop gr 12/enroll gr 12))))*100
Note: For years prior to 2002-03 California Department of Education used a different criteria to define a dropout.


In the last two years, 4,464 youth have dropped out of high school in the city of San José.



San José High Schools Showed a Decline - Now Below the Rising Rate of the State of California Four Year Dropout Rate

The following chart compares San José high schools dropout rates with the State of California and County of Santa Clara schools. San José showed a decrease in the dropout rate, while the State of California and County of Santa Clara schools showed an increase. This is the first year that dropout counts are derived from student-level data. The new method of calculating dropouts has, in general, has caused the dropout rates to rise in the State of California. San José schools are now below the 21% dropout rate in the State of California.

Chart 41



National Significance - San José is Not Alone

Until recently, official dropout statistics have told a misleading and relatively unalarming story. By reporting only the proportion of students who leave school each year without completing a diploma ("event" dropout rates) districts showed dropout rates as low as 3-5%. Recent use of cohort data that compares the number of young people in eighth grade with those graduating from high school four years later tells a different story. Nationally, over 30% and in particular neighborhoods of many cities, 50% or more of students do not appear to be completing high school in a timely manner. Putting faces to the dropout statistics tells yet a more troubling story of race and income disparity. In 2002, about a third of all high school noncompleters were poor (33.7%). A recent report by the Manhattan Institute places the high school completion rates for Black and Latino students at a dismal 55 percent and 53 percent, respectively (Greene 2001). These statistics reflect, in large part, the "weak promotion power" of close to half the schools in the nation's 35 largest cities. Nearly 50 percent of the students in these schools do not graduate in four years (Balfanz and Legters 2001). Due to their higher dropout rates and their concentration in the poor communities of some of our nation's largest cities, young men of color are especially at risk for the poor life outcomes associated with inadequate educational attainment.

A look at school practices and policies that produce such outcomes suggests that some of these young people are as much "push-outs" as "dropouts". The New York Times put it this way in July 2003: "Many schools are trying to get rid of those who may tarnish the schools' statistics by failing to graduate on time. Even though state law gives students the right to stay in high school until they are 21, many students are being counseled, or even forced, to leave long before then."

A number of factors are creating new pressures and opportunities to undertake more systemic approaches to the problem. These include:

- Heightened pressure from "No Child Left Behind" Act (NCLB) on states and districts to focus on schools not making adequate yearly progress, a list that includes many of the large inner city high schools that are losing the most young people;
- Increase in the number of 16-18 year olds aging out of foster care without a high school diploma and no clear pathway to further education opportunities or economic security;
- Growth in zero tolerance policies and broad interpretation of their intent resulting in a surge in the number of young people pushed out of high school without a diploma;
- National media attention to the push-out and dropout rates in a number of major cities, including Houston, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago; and
- The proliferation of small schools and the development in some cities of a more diverse portfolio of high schools, including new small schools being created through grass roots energies of parents and educators and through the efforts of successful educational models and their intermediaries.

Increasingly, high school reformers are realizing that to reach scale and to achieve their equity goals, they will have to develop systems and schools that are capable of engaging the large number of young people who are disconnecting from and eventually leave or are pushed out of high school. Thus far, efforts have mainly been in the arena of prevention: e.g. breaking down large schools into smaller learning communities, offering double periods of core subjects and "catch-up" coursework, and providing more choice among differently organized and smaller schools. Some communities have also established a new program for one or more of the identified "at risk" subpopulations of youth.

While these strategies may help reduce the future scope of the outof-school youth problem, most efforts still tend to be piecemeal. Too little attention is paid to ending the practice of pushing out youth who arrive at high school doors under-educated and with limited skill development. Too little effort is made to gather data on the young people who leave high school, both to ensure that they are reengaged and to assess their progress. And far too few quality options are available for young people who have severed their ties to school. There appears to be a lack of political will to undertake the stillneeded effort to monitor and eradicate the race and class inequities that continue to place low-income African American and Hispanic youth in systems without resources and capacity to provide quality educational options. Some of these young people find their way to one or more of the alternative education or youth employment programs that constitute the "second chance" sector. But such programming is disparate, fragmented, and seriously under-resourced.



State of California - Call to Action

A crisis is brewing in California schools, revealed not by poor grades or declining test scores but a far more ordinary symptom: empty seats. Only 69 percent of the state's students are graduating from high school on time, according to recent research by Harvard University and the Urban Institute¹.

For minority students, the news is worse. Only 55 percent of African American students, and 57 percent of Latino students, graduate with regular diplomas. The figures are even lower for male students in these groups.

The research, based on new methods for calculating dropout data, has issued a wake-up call for California schools. "The number of youth who aren't getting a high school diploma is staggering," says Anne Stanton, director of Irvine's Youth program. "The failure to educate, connect, and help young people complete a significant milestone like high school has huge ramifications, both for the individual lives of these young people and for the economy of California. When you think of the cumulative effect of these statistics over a decade or more, the implications are tragic."

Public awareness of the problem is so low because data on graduation rates is often wrong, with states and localities using a wide variety of methods and standards for calculating dropout rates, and minimal state or federal oversight of graduation rates for accuracy. As a result, dropout data can be strikingly misleading. In some states, for example, a five (5) percent dropout rate has been reported for African Americans, when the real number is closer to 50 percent.

And in California, what is officially reported as a nearly 87 percent graduation rate is actually, when measured with a more thorough Urban Institute method, just under 69 percent, according to the report. Dropouts for minority youth in California schools are similarly underestimated by official data.

Some scholars cast doubt on the testing emphasis of recent school reform efforts. In many schools, they argue, to boost aggregate test scores low-performing students are either being held back, which increases their likelihood of eventually dropping out, or pushed out of the system altogether. "It is no success for anyone," Harvard's Orfield writes, "if a school raises its average test scores by flunking out low-scoring students and ruining their future."

The Losing Our Future report also criticizes the California system for its "soft" approach to holding schools accountable on graduate rates. "California's appearance of having a high graduation rate standard is an illusion," according to the study.

The state is "among the weakest" of 39 states that establish a graduation rate goal but "give an accountability 'pass' to any school or district that falls below the goal, yet shows 'any improvement." As a result, the researchers point out, a change as slight as 1/10th of 1 percent over the previous year could pass the accountability test. As an example, the report cites the San Bernardino School District, which could continue to pass the state's minimal "improvement" standard

but, at its current rate, still take 500 years to meet California's goal of 100 percent graduation. "This research focuses attention on the need to make education relevant for California students, and to the fact that high school systems aren't working for many young people," says Irvine's Anne Stanton. "It's a call to action."

Santa Clara County

There has been ongoing but disparate efforts to address the issue of out of school youth (OOSY) in San José. School/City/County/Nonprofit collaborative efforts have been formed to leverage efforts toward improving school outcomes. Some examples include: Truancy Abatement Collaborative, Mayor's Gang Prevention Task Force, Juvenile Detention Reform Effort, Greater San José Alternative Education Collaborative, San José Police Department Truancy Abatement and Burglary Suppression, Youth Organizations United for Reform. Some efforts have been slowed by recent budget reductions, but the more important barriers have been the need for a unifying collaborative effort where everyone is working in concert toward advancing education options for OOSY. Also, new strategies and approaches need to be shaped in response to the recent economic funding environment.

Since 2001, People Acting in Community Together (PACT) has led a grassroots effort, involving hundreds of parents, teachers, students, and other concerned community people, to raise public concern about the growing problem of cutbacks and closures of alternative schools and programs. Overall, progress in promoting alternative educational programming has been uneven, with several new school initiatives emerging in the area over the past few years, while at the same time the overall availability of alternatives has declined. A planning task force (entitled Santa Clara County Alternative Schools Collaborative) was staffed by the Santa Clara Office of Education and generated a report in 2004. The Task Force documented the fact that the number of alternative school students enrolled in Santa Clara County has decreased by 43% over the past six years, while the overall state level has seen an increase of 2%, with the unfortunate result that Santa Clara County is last in Counties with total enrollments over 90,000. The report called for a 10% reduction in dropouts and a 10% increase in alternative educational students served, as well as other system improvements.

Of the over 70,000 students in public high schools (not alternative high schools), it is estimated that as many as 12%, over 14,000 students, have one or more of the risk factors that indicate the student might benefit from an alternative placement or approach. The 2000 Census indicated that just under 80% of Santa Clara County residents obtain a high school diploma by age twenty-five. Close examination of race, gender, and class demographics indicate serious concerns of disproportionate impact and over-representation with certain ethnic groups, females, and economically disadvantaged youth.

¹ Harvard's Civil Rights Project: Confronting The Graduation Rate Crisis In California. March 24, 2005. http://www.civilrightsproject. harvard.edu/research/dropouts/dropouts_qen.php

Population of Concern

Various circumstances place a student at risk of not succeeding in regular school programs, and may warrant consideration for placement in alternative programs. Such circumstances include, but are not limited to:

- Poor school attendance;
- Poor grades;
- Lack of grade appropriate skills;
- Emotional or behavioral difficulties;
- Personal circumstances that require greater flexibility in a school program;
- Parenthood or expected parenthood;
- Behind in credit for graduation;
- Repeated failure to pass the high school exit exam;
- Dropped out of school;
- Dissatisfaction with regular high school program;
- Incarcerated youth; Removed, suspended, or expelled from school;
- Limited extracurricular participation;
- Failure to see the relevance of education to life
 - experience;
- Boredom with school;
- Inability to tolerate structured instruction;
- Feelings of alienation;
- Mental health difficulties;
- Foster youth;
- Shelter children; and
- Different learning styles which fall short of eligibility for Special education services.

A Call to Action by the New President of the California State Senate Darrell Steinberg

"Once upon a time, an American president challenged our country to put a man on the moon in a decade and we achieved it. With enough public pressure and strategic resources, California can solve a simpler challenge, though one that threatens our well being far more than any space race ever did: the dropout crisis. Let us resolve to cut it in half, or better, in 10 years."

Guest Editorial by Darrell Stienberg

The full editorial is on the next page.

San Francisco Chronicle: "ON BRIDGING THE 'OPPORTUNITY GAP'" Monday, July 21, 2008 Attack the dropout crisis

Written by:

Darrell Steinberg President California State Senate

Once upon a time, an American president challenged our country to put a man on the moon in a decade and we achieved it. With enough public pressure and strategic resources, California can solve a simpler challenge, though one that threatens our well being far more than any space race ever did: the dropout crisis. Let us resolve to cut it in half, or better, in 10 years.

We now know just how bad it is. Using a new and far more accurate system to track student enrollment, the Department of Education reports that one in four teenagers who start high school in California don't finish. Last year alone, more than 140,000 students abandoned middle and high school.

More than a wake-up call, these numbers mark a beginning - a baseline from which we can measure progress. The rationale for increasing accountability for graduation rates was always that we didn't have reliable dropout counts on which to base demands for improvement. Those days are gone. We can no longer hide behind uncertainty, and starting now, we need a campaign to end this blight.

That campaign needs two components in order to succeed: high expectations and greater support. We have only begun to ask our schools to attend to the crisis. My Senate Bill 219, signed into law last year, requires that 8th and 9th grade dropout rates be factored into the Academic Performance Index, the state's barometer of school success. The law takes effect in 2011, and now we've got the data to make it work.

But schools can't do it alone. That's why my top priority as Senate leader will be a comprehensive, bipartisan legislative strategy to transform our secondary schools into places where more students want to be. That means:

- -- Scaling up what works. Data provides capacity to identify successful districts and schools and use those lessons to help those that are struggling.
- -- More adults on campus providing support and guidance. Time and again the at-risk students who testified before my committee said it was a caring relationship with a band leader, a basketball coach, counselor, teacher or grandmotherly attendance clerk who kept them coming back.
- -- Real alternative schools not dumping grounds for teens for whom the big comprehensive high school simply does not work. And let's agree that 3,000 student high schools with 50 percent dropout rates should be extinct.
- -- Hands-on, rigorous career technical education that allows students to not only envision a professional future for themselves but puts them on a path toward college, apprenticeship or career and arms them to thrive in the new economy.

This is about more than just requiring all 8th graders to take algebra (which could be a recipe for more dropouts unless we commit to getting them the well-trained math teachers they need). Real change costs something - as every respected reform study has told us over the past few years. It's also about deploying resources differently. But what better rallying cry than a campaign to end the dropout plight?

This is a trifecta: an economic development strategy that can draw on high public concern about education and the environment. We're entering a brave new phase of our economy, and the renewable energy revolution could be California's next Silicon Valley, if we play our cards right. We must feed that revolution with skilled workers, from linemen and plumbers to product marketers and engineers. An educated and nimble workforce will strengthen existing businesses and attract entrepreneurial energy to ignite our future prosperity. We won't get there by losing 140,000 kids a year.

The costs of dropouts are well documented, the numbers increasingly accurate. Now that we know what we know, let's commit to graduating 90 percent of our kids, ready for college or career, by 2020. We can afford to do no less.

Alternative Programs -Number of Slots the Highest in Seven Years

Alternative programs such as institutional schools; high school continuation classes; academy, community, and teen parent programs; and independent study serve as linkages between the public high schools and the population of children not enrolled in school. While enrolled in these programs, these youngsters are counted as enrolled in public school. Various other programs such as magnet programs are sometimes referred to as alternative programs, but they do not serve this linkage function, and are therefore included above with comprehensive high school programs. The following table shows the enrollment of students by program type as collected each fall on the date when all districts report enrollment for alternative, continuation, community day schools, juvenile court schools, and county community schools. Data is from the Education Data Partnership web site funded by the California Department of Education based on data provided by school districts.

Table 60

	Public Enrollment in Alternative Schools in Santa Clara County								
	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	Change
Alternative	1,123	925	615	620	849	1,004	1,241	2,222	98%
Continuation	2,341	2,370	2,316	2,313	2,241	2,073	2,249	2,253	-4%
Community Day	225	305	347	366	336	243	299	416	85%
Juvenile Court	616	493	557	361	353	306	310	441	-28%
County Community	727	610	239	209	165	234	220	262	-64%
Special Education	1,242	1,350	1,371	1,437	1,416	1,455	1,382	1,300	5%
Total Enrollment	254,004	248,777	250,435	251,208	253,065	254,622	255,722	259,116	2%
Percent in Alternatives	2.0%	1.9%	1.6%	1.5%	1.6%	1.5%	1.7%	2.2%	9%
Total Alternative Schools	5,032	4,703	4,074	3,869	3,944	3,860	4,319	5,594	11%

Source: Education Data Partnership - California Department of Education

Note: Percent Change is based on comparison of 2007-08 to 2000-01.

Percent - Alternative School Slots for San José High School Districts

Table 61

									Percent
San Jose Unified	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	Change
Alternative	647	547	229	246	272	198	240	282	-56%
Continuation	388	393	402	392	434	435	473	466	20%
Community Day School	31	30	94	103	83	63	67	83	168%
Total Alternative Schools	1,066	970	725	741	789	696	780	831	-22%
Total Enrollment	33,015	32,309	32,612	32,314	31,874	31,646	30,912	31,230	-5%
Percent in Alternatives	3.2%	3.0%	2.2%	2.3%	2.5%	2.2%	2.5%	2.7%	-18%

East Side Union High	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	Percent Change
Alternative	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0%
Continuation	876	882	865	850	784	758	730	696	-21%
Community Day School	32	83	79	86	92	-	-	-	-100%
Total Alternative Schools	908	965	944	936	876	758	730	696	-23%
Total Enrollment	24,282	23,665	24,409	24,573	25,496	25,817	26,008	26,280	8%
Percent in Alternatives	3.7%	4.1%	3.9%	3.8%	3.4%	2.9%	2.8%	2.6%	-29%

Campbell Union High	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	Percent Change
Alternative	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0%
Continuation	318	294	280	264	234	125	242	273	-14%
Community Day School	-	-	-	27	30	35	42	47	100%
Total Alternative Schools	318	294	280	291	264	160	284	320	1%
Total Enrollment	7,472	7,310	7,527	7,500	7,803	7,721	7,779	7,838	5%
Percent in Alternatives	4.3%	4.0%	3.7%	3.9%	3.4%	2.1%	3.7%	4.1%	-4%

									Percent
County Office of Educ.	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	Change
Community Day School	47	99	73	53	52	61	101	211	349%
Juvenile Court	616	493	557	361	353	306	310	441	-28%
County Community	727	610	239	209	165	234	220	262	-64%
Total Alternative Schools	1,343	1,103	796	570	518	540	530	914	-32%
Total Enrollment	2,632	2,552	2,240	2,089	2,270	2,521	2,982	3,604	37%
Percent in Alternatives	51.0%	43.2%	35.5%	27.3%	22.8%	21.4%	17.8%	25.4%	-50%

Source: Education Data Partnership - California Department of Education

Note: Percent Change is based on comparison of 2007-08 to 2000-01.

of slots available to districts. Last year, the county had 1,296 slots for students at this higher funding level and used 416 slots last year. This is up 117 students from the previous year. To further reduce the dropout rate San José needs to continue to build more options and alternatives for youth not succeeding in the comprehensive

high schools.

County wide, the

school students in

years. Through

the highest in seven

the community day

schools, the State has added significant funding to serve these high risk students. The funding allows up to \$14,000 a student, limiting the number


number of alternative

Number of alternative slots for youth who struggle in school is increasing county wide but has declined 20% in San José School Districts

The work of the Superior Court's Special Committee on Education of Youth of the Juvenile Court has encouraged an increase in delivering special education services to additional youth in our community. A similar push needs to made by our community to build alternatives and options for youth who are not succeeding in our comprehensive high schools. During the 2005 school year, East Side Union High School District (ESUHSD) shut down their Cadet Academy with over 90 youth attending. This move shifted the number of community day school students in East Side Union High School District to zero and has remained as such for the last three years. San José School Districts can follow the lead of other Santa Clara County Districts that are increasing the number of alternative school slots available to their students.

As a community, it is imperative that we collectively find a way to use our education funding provided by the State of California to meet the needs of all our youths, even the most difficult to serve.

Chart 42



The decline in alternative school slots in San José makes it much harder for high-risk youth to take advantage of educational funds available to them. San José youth need options and multiple paths to a high school education.

\$19 Million Lost to Socialize San José Youth

The table below shows the amount of funds lost to socialize youth who drop out of school. Lost funds refers to the amount of Average Daily Attendance (ADA) dollars unrecoverable from the State.

Table 62

Funds Lost to Socialize San José Youth Who Drop Out of School							
Funds Lost to Drop Outs in FY 2006- 07 for San José Schools	Gr. 7 Drop Outs	Gr. 8 Drop Outs	Gr. 9 Drop Outs	Gr. 10 Drop Outs	Gr. 11 Drop Outs	Gr. 12 Drop Outs	Total Lost
Number of Drop Outs	99	86	50	42	160	1,262	1,699
Number of Years of Lost ADA Funds	5.5	4.5	3.5	2.5	1.5	0.5	
Lost Funds for Socializing Youth	\$ 4,846,050	\$ 3,444,300	\$ 1,697,500	\$ 1,018,500	\$ 2,328,000	\$ 6,120,700	\$ 19,455,050

Note the above drop out data is not adjusted using student-level data that would increase the total number of dropouts.

Table 63

Funds Availabe for Each Student FY 06-07							
District	AD	A Funds					
Alum Rock School District	\$	8,815					
Berryessa Union Elementary	\$	7,567					
Franklin McKinley School District	\$	8,254					
East Side Union School District	\$	9,529					
San Jose Unified School District	\$	10,527					
Campbell High School District	\$	9,061					
Moreland School District	\$	9,411					

The above table is based on the assumption that a youth that drops out does not come back to school. The analysis is also based on the assumption that if a youth dropout, he is recorded as a dropout for half of the school year. The table has not been discussed with the San José school districts and is based on data reported by school districts to California Department of Education. The Evaluation Team presents this estimate to generate discussion and action to find a way to recapture these lost opportunities and funds, not to point fingers or lay blame.

Lost Revenue Due to Drop Outs Over Last Six Years is \$141 Million


Over the last five years, the San José has lost \$141 million that could be used to ensure a productive and healthy future for our youth who dropped out of school. The reduction in dropouts from last year to this year means an additional savings of \$15 million to ensure healthy futures for our youth.

Table 64

Revenue Lost Due to Drop Outs						
School Year	School Year					
2002	\$	14,450,453				
2003	\$	17,347,000				
2004	\$	23,647,400				
2005	\$	31,847,800				
2006	\$	34,377,000				
2007	\$	19,455,050				
Total	\$	141,124,703				

Note: The reduction in dropouts from 2006 to 2007 is a good indicator that San José is well on its way to meeting the goal set by the President of the California Senate, Darrel Steinberg, to cut the State dropout rate by 50% in the next ten years.

Chart 43





Census Bureau Report Shows 'Big Payoff' from Educational Degrees for Youth and Society

School success has been linked to reducing the likelihood that a youth will experience negative outcomes such as drugs, gangs, and delinquency. On the flip side, in addition to avoiding risky behaviors, academic achievement can translate into opportunity. In fact, over an adult's working life, high school graduates can expect, on average, to earn \$1.2 million; those with a bachelor's degree, \$2.1 million; and people with a master's degree, \$2.5 million, according to a report released by the Commerce Department's Census Bureau. People with doctoral (\$3.4 million) and professional degrees (\$4.4 million) do even better. "At most ages, more education equates with higher earnings, and the payoff is most notable at the highest educational levels," said Jennifer Cheeseman Day, co-author of *The Big Payoff: Educational Attainment and Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings*. The estimates of work-life earnings are based on 1999 earnings projected over a typical work life, defined as the period from ages 25 through 64.

In 2000, 84% of American adults age 25 and over had at least completed high school and 26 percent had a bachelor's degree or higher, both all-time highs. Currently, almost nine out of ten young adults graduate from high school and about six out of ten high school seniors go on to college the following year.

Our society should be interested in increasing the number of educated youth, because we will save money as indicated in the RAND study, which states that for every dollar invested in education, \$1.90 will be saved in future costs to society. Additionally, we receive another benefit when our youth graduate from high school and go on to higher education or career training: we will receive more tax dollars from their increased income.

Summary of Cost Due to Dropping Out of School

- Raising high school completion rate by 1% will save United States \$1.4 billion annually in crime-related costs.
- Between welfare benefits and crime, dropouts create an annual estimated cost of \$24 billion to the public.
- United States would save \$41.8 billion in health care costs if the 600,000 dropouts were to complete one more year
 of schooling.
- A 1999 study from the National Center of Juvenile Justice reveals that the cost to society for each youth that drops out of school to become involved in a life of crime and drug abuse is \$1.7 million.

Finding a way to serve our dropouts will save our society billions of dollars in the future.

The dropout problem presents a diverse set of challenges to American society. Three-quarters of state prison inmates and 59% of federal inmates are dropouts. [1] Moreover, dropouts are 3.5 times more likely than high school completers to be imprisoned at some point during their lifetime. [2] Raising the high school completion rate 1% for all men ages 20-60 would save the US \$1.4 billion annually in crime-related costs. [3]

Dropouts earn less and require greater public assistance than high school completers. Compared to 11% for high school graduates, 25% of dropouts were unemployed for a year or more during the four year span of 1997- 2001.[4] Between welfare benefits and crime, dropouts create an annual estimated cost of \$24 billion to the public.[5] Moreover, scholars argue, the US would save \$41.8 billion in health care costs if the 600,000 dropouts in 2004 were to complete one more year of schooling.[6]

A 1999 study from the National Center of Juvenile Justice reveals that the cost to society for each youth that drops out of school to become involved in a life of crime and drug abuse is \$1.7 million. [7]

[1] Harlow, C.W. (2003). Education and correctional populations, bureau of justice statistics special report. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.

[2] Catterall, J.S. (1985). On the social cost of dropping out. Stanford, CA: Center for Education Research, cited in Alliance for Excellent Education. (2004, December). Measuring graduation to measure success. Washington, DC: Author.

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[4] Wald, M., & Martinez, T. (2003). Connected by 25: Improving life chances of the country's most vulnerable 14-24-year-olds. William and Flora Hewlett Foundation Working Paper. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Retrieved December 27, 2005 from www.youthtransitions.org

[5] Thorstensen, B. I. If you build it, they will come: Investing in public education. Retrieved December 27, 2005 from http://abec.unm.edu/resources/gallery/present/invest_in_ed.pdf

[6] Muenning, P. (2005, October). Health returns to education interventions. Paper presented at the symposium on the social costs of inadequate education, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, NY. Retrieved December 27, 2005 from http://www.tc.columbia.edu/centers/EquityCampaign/symposium/resourceDetails.asp? PresId=5

[7] Snyder, Howard. Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report.

A Challenge to the Residents of San José

The previous data reveals that, each year, the residents of San José are foregoing State funds allocated to educate their youth. If we look at the number of youth not attending school, dropping out of school, and failing in traditional school settings, over \$54 million in State funds that could be used to ensure a positive pro-social future for our youth is lost. One of the biggest needs for San José, particularly in this time of budget reductions and declining revenue, is to maximize the dollars made available by the State to educate youth. As a community, we need to find ways to create more small alternative schools and options with the capacity to reach out to youth not attending or succeeding in school. Getting these youth into schools that meet their needs will allow communities to generate revenue to socialize and prepare all our youth for a healthy productive future.



San José Schools API Scores Have Increased by 12% Since 1999

Dr. Rex Green, an associate of CCPA, and Jason Helgerson, formerly of the San José Mayor's Office, used hierarchical linear modeling to compare the success of San José schools to other schools in the Santa Clara County. Since their initial research, the State Department of Education has been assigning API scores to districts (after 2003). Data suggest that San José schools were among the lowest performing in the county in 1998-99 but had one of the highest rates of improvement. Results from the last school year will reveal whether San José schools were able to continue their high rate of improvement.

Comparison of Academic Performance among Schools and Districts in Santa Clara County

All public school districts and schools in Santa Clara County were compared using the specially constructed academic performance index (API) for the school years 1998-1999, 1999-2000, and 2000-2001. The API is a weighted composite of test scores for grades 1-12 covering skills in reading, mathematics, and language, as well as spelling and science depending on grade level. The tests are administered statewide throughout the school system. The State's definition of an adequate academic performance across all students attending school is a score of 800 or better.

Hierarchical linear modeling of these data was chosen to estimate the initial level of academic performance in 1998-99 and the rate of change over the subsequent two school years. A three-level analysis was selected to include the effects on school performance of differences among school districts. Comparison of the levels three years ago with the growth or decline since then across schools and districts will reveal how well the San José school districts are performing relative to other districts in the County, as well as how individual schools within the district are performing. Schools that show rapid rates of improvement in API scores reflect successful efforts to improve performance, while low performing schools that are declining probably need assistance in finding ways to raise levels of performance. Districts that started at lower levels of performance and did not improve similarly need support to improve their performance.

Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) described the type of analysis needed to examine patterns of change over time for nested levels, in this case schools within districts. The latest version of their program, HLM5 (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2001) was employed to

obtain estimates of initial level and rate of change for each school and district. Included in the analyses were variables to predict differences in initial level and rate of change. At the school level three variables were added: percent of caucasion students, percent of male students, and level of schooling being elementary, middle, or high school. At the district level two variables were added: median family income from the 1990 census and dollars spent per student during the 2000-2001 school year. All variables were re-coded to range from 0 to 100, with zero being the lowest score and 100 being the highest score; the district level variables were re-coded so that 0 to 100 reflected the range of actual scores. Median family income and dollars per student also were re-coded during the analysis to reflect the deduction of the mean from all scores.

The formulas for the prediction equations were:

Level-1 Model

$$Y = P0 + P1*(OCC) + E$$

Level-2 Model

```
P0 = B00 + B01*(PCMAL100) + B02*(PCWHI100) +
B03*(ELVHS100) + B04*(MIVHS100) + R0
P1 = B10 + B11*(PCMAL100) + B12*(PCWHI100) +
B13*(ELVHS100) + B14*(MIVHS100) + R1
```

Level-3 Model

```
B00 = G000 + G001(FAMIN100) + G002(D0LKD100) + U00
B01 = G010
B02 = G020
B03 = G030
B04 = G040
B10 = G100 + G101(FAMIN100) + G102(D0LKD100) + U10
B11 = G110
B12 = G120
B13 = G130
B14 = G140
```



The results of the HLM analysis are presented in the table below; the regression coefficients are labeled as shown in the prediction equations. Examining the p-values, the most significant predictors of initial level of academic performance were percent white students attending school and median level of family income in the district. The most significant predictors of change in performance were percent white students, median family income, and attending elementary versus high school. The results indicated that schools with higher percent white students and districts with higher median family incomes performed better initially but that lower percent white students and lower median family income predicted more rapid improvement. Further, elementary schools' academic performance improved more rapidly than that of high schools'.

Table 65

Coefficients and Significance Levels - HLM Regression Analysis									
First Year-1998-99	Parameter	Coefficient	T-value	P-value					
Intercept	G000	712.29	55.06	0					
Family Income	G001	1.92	4.42	0					
School Funds per Child	G002	-0.51	-0.97	0.343					
Percent Male	G010	0.32	8.0	0.426					
Percent White	G020	3.67	5.72	0					
Elementary vs. H.S.	G030	0.3	1.69	0.09					
Middle School vs. H.S.	G040	0.15	0.83	0.407					
	Rate of Chan	ge							
Intercept	G100	13.24	9.79	0					
Family Income	G101	-0.13	-3.84	0.001					
School Funds per Child	G102	0.08	1.22	0.235					
Percent Male	G110	0.01	0.12	0.906					
Percent White	G120	-0.2	-5.04	0					
Elementary vs. H.S.	G130	0.13	3.14	0.002					
Middle School vs. H.S.	G140	0.05	1.28	0.201					

The regression model is linked to the table with reference to the parameters mentioned. The first parameter is G000, the intercept for estimating the API score for school year 1998-99. The coefficient of 712 indicates that across schools this score represented the level of academic performance for that year. Note, this API score was below the California recommended level of 800. Thus, the typical school in Santa Clara County was scoring below the state's recommended level of achievement. The rate of change over four years was G100, 13.24. Multiplying by 4, the typical school in Santa Clara County was performing at 765 by 2002, still below the state's recommended level. Both the first year estimated API score for all schools and the rate of change per year were significantly greater than zero, as indicated by the large t-values and zero p-values.

Predicting a particular school's API score also depended on several other pieces of information. In the regression model, the collection of all four scores is represented by two numbers, the score for the first year and the rate of change occurring each year. The same predictor variables significantly influenced the estimation of both of these numbers, percent of white students, level of family income, and being in an elementary school instead of a high school. Schools in a neighborhood (census district) with a higher family income or schools with more white students attending achieved higher scores for 1998-99 but experienced lower rates of change. Elementary schools performed at higher levels than did high schools in 1998-99 and improved faster over time.





How are San José schools doing?

Estimates for the first year and rate of change parameters for each school and school district were obtained from the model described previously. There were 28 school districts compared and 333 schools. Two of the 28 districts were formed by combining school districts with one or two schools each; for example, three elementary school districts with a total of four schools were combined: Loma Prieta, Luther Burbank, and Orchard. The other districts that were combined were not located in the San José area. The API scores estimated for entire school districts in the San José area are listed in the following table.

Alum Rock and Franklin McKinley School Districts have shown the most Growth in API Scores Since 1999

Table 66

Academic Performance Index - Sa	n José School	Districts	
Academic Ferrormance index - 3a	in Jose School	Districts	
	Estimated		Percent
	for 1999	2007	Change
Alum Rock Union Elementary	506	700	38%
Berryessa Union Elementary	700	794	13%
Cambrian Elementary	793	850	7%
Campbell Union Elementary	711	774	9%
Campbell Union High	656	752	15%
Cupertino Union Schools	866	929	7%
East Side Union High	607	709	17%
Evergreen Elementary	759	830	9%
Franklin McKinley Elementary	537	707	32%
Fremont Union High	779	840	8%
Loma Prieta, Luther Burbank & Orchard	693	797	15%
Moreland Elementary	766	820	7%
Morgan Hill Unified	718	758	6%
Mt. Pleasant Elementary	641	725	13%
Oak Grove Elementary	739	773	5%
San Jose Unified	626	759	21%
Santa Clara Unified	685	747	9%
Union Elementary	804	851	6%
Average District	699	784	12%

The average San José Area school district API score was 699 and increased 12% to 784 by 2007. By comparison, for other Santa Clara County school districts, the average API score in 1998-99 was 795. It appears that San José schools are closing the performance gap. However, while other districts are achieving API average scores over the state recommended level of 800, some San José school districts are still falling short of the goal.



